This paper tries to estimate the impact of a GSTP on the level of trade in manufactures between the countries of the South. In doing so, it is assumed that all countries of the South (at least all those included in the sample of developing countries used in this paper) will become member-countries of the GSTP; China, however, is not (yet) considered to be a GSTP-member. Also, possible special and preferential measures in favour of the least-developed member-countries are not taken into account; although such measures are envisaged in principle under the Agreement, the present analysis deals with all developing countries on an equal footing.
In analysing the trade-stimulating impact on South-South trade of a lowering of TCMs between developing countries, the first step is to determine to what extent existing TCMs actually restrain mutual trade.
The approach adopted here is discussed in section 2 of the paper; tariff levels are taken to be representative of the total level of protection through TCMs, and the gravity equation is introduced as the tooi to be used in assessing the trade-restraining effect of these tariffs. Section 3 describes the data set and the estimation procedure foliowed in determining the parameter values of the gravity equation containing tariff levels. The regression results obtained are used in section 4 to simulate the effects of a (preferential) lowering of the initial tariff levels of the countries of the South, for a 20 or 50 percent linear tariff reduction. The difficult issue of trade creation versus trade diversion is dealt with by distinguishing between the two extreme cases of no trade diversion at all and maximum trade diversion from industrial-country imports to imports from the South. Also, a distinction is made between short-term and long-term effects. Section 5 gives a summary and conclusions.
All this refers to total trade in manufactures, for the countries included in the sample. Due to resource contraints, an intended application at a lower level of product aggregation (differentiating between, say, four or five main product groups) could not be realized as yet.
2-Estimating the impact of TCMs on the level of trade
Since the introduction of statistical techniques in applied economie analysis in the 1930s, the area of international trade relations has been one of the fields most intensively studied with the help of econometrie methods. There is, e.g.. a vast literature analyzing relationships involving prices and quantities of goods traded internationally, both at the level of individual commodities and at the level of aggregates such as total imports and exports. Empirical studies have stimulated further theoretical and methodological work, an( i vice versa.
Analysis of the impact of TCMs forms part of this body of knowledge.
Empirical analysis of TCMs has focussed in particular on the effects of import tariffs, including other TCMs that can be translated in terms of tariff charges. The impact of those TCMs that cannot readily be expressed in a tariff equivalent is often much more difficult to assess empirically 1 -except in such straightforward cases as, e.g., outright prohibition of exports or imports. Due to the wide array of TCMs other than tariff charges (see Verbruggen, 1988) , the uncertainty about the extent or degree of their actual application, and occasionally indeed the near-ignorance about the kind of effects to be expected from their use, tariff levels may perforce have to be used as a pars pro toto or even as indicative of the level of NTBs as well. The present study also will adhere to this approach; thus, tariff levels are taken to be indicative of the overall intensity of a country's TCMs, and a lowering of these levels is assumed to lead to an increase in trade as if import tariffs were the only TCM restricting imports. In the words of Erzan, Laird and Yeats (1986, p. 3) , this approach "implies that any nontariff measures facing these imports will be relaxed to an extent that allows the full trade effects of the tariff [lowering] to be achieved.
A further related assumption is that other barriers to expanding imports, such as balance-of-payment or currency constraints, are also relaxed".
Taking the tariff levels as the point of departure for an analysis of the impact of trade impediments on the level of foreign trade, the question arises what methodology to use in assessing this impact. In earlier -studies of trade flow3~~ as~ Tëlited" Tö tariff structure, preferential trading arrangements, customs unions, and the like, a variety of approaches has been foliowed. According to Karsenty and Laird (1986) , four main approaches may be distinguished:
(a) constant market share analysis, for specific products or in the aggregate; (b) partial equilibrium studies, based on import demand functions for specific disaggregated products; (c) gravity models, used to determine aggregate trade flows;
(d) computable general equilibriumn models for (highly) aggregated products and industries.
Each of the four approaches has its stronger and weaker points. From a theoretical point of view, the latter approach is the most ambitious and satisfactory one; it is also the most exacting one in terms of the See e.g. Deardorff and Stern (1985) . data, time, and effort involved.
Apart from this, the choice of method will be influenced by the particulars of the problem on hand, and possibly by the availability of data.
In this paper, a gravity model will be used to estimate the impact of tariffs on the level of trade. Reasons for this choice were (a) the need to deal with total trade in manufactures (in particular between developing countries), thus necessitating a high level of aggregation over products, and (b) the availability of tariff (and NTB) data for one 'year' only, prompting a cross-section analysis over countries. The gains of using this convenient approach are obtained at a price, however; in its usual formulation, the gravity model is not convincingly based on received theory and "its use for policy is severely hampered by its "unidentified" properties". * Because of its present use in a comparative-staties context, these drawbacks of the gravity equation may not be too serious; further discussion of this issue follows below. It should be noted here already that the use of the gravity model implies that direct trade effects only will be quantified; indirect effects via a trade-growth relationship are not taken into account in this setting.
The--gravity equation-describes the trade--ftovr between exporting and importing country as resulting from the combined effect of three sets of factors:
(a) variables representing the supply side or export potential, (b) variables representing the demand side or import potential, and (c) variables affecting the intensity of trade between the two (potential) trade partners.
As the present analysis focusses -on the impact of TGMs on trade in manufactures, the following have been selected as explanatory variables in the gravity equation:
(1) the value added of the manufacturing sector in the exporting See e.g. Whalley (1985) and Srinivasan and Whalley (1986) . Anderson (1979) , p. 106. Trade theory on which to base the gravity equation is discussed also in Bergstrand (1985) and in Helpman and Krugman (1985) . Merkies and Van der Meer (1988) discuss the relation between the gravity model and the extended Armington model. country, representing the supply potential;
(2) the value of GNP of the importing country, representing demand potential;
(3) and (4) population size of the exporting and the importing country, respectively. Note that population size is to be seen here as a proxy for the economies of scale in manufacturing production that can be realized in the home market; the larger the population size is, the lower the need to realize economies of scale through export production (for the exporting country), and the greater the chances of realizing in domestic production the (6) for the exporting country, the level of TCMs affecting its imports of manufactured"p^roducts". Héncé, the variable indicating the level of TCMs -which is in this study in fact the level of import tariffs, as a pars pro toto -appears twice in the gravity equation, both at the import side and at the export side. In terms of the three sets of trade-determining factors referred to above, the TCM variable at the export side is to be seen as belonging to set (a), i.e. as a factor reducing a country's export potential. While a lowering of the level of TCMs is likely to raise the level of imports in the short run already, the corresponding effects at the export side may take a much longer time to materialize as they require a change in market orientation and probably even a certain restructuring of manufacturing production; For particulars on the Trade Information System and its data, see Verbruggen (1988) . Verbruggen (1988) . It should be noted that for all importing developing countries the tariff-level variable has been measured as the unweighted, rather than the import-weighted, average ad valorem import tariff for the total manufacturing sector, as the former average could be calculated for a much larger number of sample countries. The tariff level variables for the remaining exporting OECD countries are based on import-weighted pre-Tokyo Round tariff levels calculated by Corbet (1979) , Deardorff and Stern (1983) and GATT (1980) .
The use of unweighted tariff averages for the developing countries might yield upward-biased estimates vis-a-vis import-weighted tariff averages, as one might expect in general that in calculating the latter, high tariff rates are given small weights and low tariff rates large weights. This bias, however, appears to be not too serious. In a sample of 29 developing countries for which both tariff averages could be calculated, weighted tariff averages were lower than unweighted averages in 14 cases; in the remaining 15 cases, the two tariff averages were nearly the same or the weighted version even exceeded the unweighted version. Based on the data set just described, the bilateral trade flows of a trade matrix of (60-1) x 39 = 2301 elements may be regressed on the proposed explanatory variables using the gravity equation in its logarithmic specification. As 608 (or 26 percent) of the cells of the trade matrix-are empty.thi^ raises" the" quest:iön~ of the" chöicè of the proper estimation procedure. A Standard OLS procedure can be applied to non-zero flows only, but this might lead to biased parameter estimates.
Well-known alternatives are a Tobit procedure (Amemiya, 1973) , a "threshold regression model" (Dagenais, 1969) , or a "censored regression model" (Nelson, 1977) . However, as Bikker (1982) has shown, much depends on the cause or causes of zero observations for trade flows, and depending upon the 'true' cause the alternative procedures may be biased as well. Furthermore, minor improvements in explaining the smallest trade flows will hardly carry any weight in the final results (as will be substantiated below). For the sake of convenience it was decided to stick to the OLS procedure; we come back to the issue of the zero flows towards the end of this section.
Thus, for the remaining 2301 -608 -1693 non-zero observations, the regression equation is specified as
In X™. studies using the gravity model, e.g. Linnemann (1966) , also found intercorrelation between GNP and population size. The latter case of multicollinearity is in itself not a serious problem in the present context, as there is no need to establish the 'true' contribution of each of these two explanatory variables separately; with respect to the tariff variable, however, it is essential to identify its proper weight in the overall explanation of the trade flows in order to assess in subsequent simulations the impact of tariff changes.
To come to grips with this problem, a series of regression analyses has been made; the results are reported in Table 1 Using these values, estimates of the remaining parameters are obtained as reported in Table 1 that the non-inclusion of the zero flows in het estimation procedure has introduced an upward bias in the predictions of the smaller flows that is significant.
•Lastly it has to be noted that even if the smallest trade flows would be overestimated somewhat when using the parameters of Table 1 Bikker (1982) , who introduced this scheme, argues that the effects referred to in the second column are erroneously neglected in conventional trade theory but might well occur in actual fact; e.g.
contraints at the supply side of LDCs might lead to a certain redirection of exports (box 2 in the scheme) from DC to LDC destinations once the latter become easier accessible. In our study, the effects described in the second column are assumed to be nonexistent, however; as the very purpose of a GSTP for manufactures is to stimulate the growth of manufacturing output in the South, it is assumed that existing export outlets to the DCs will not be damaged by increasing export possibilities elsewhere (to other LDCs).
Thus limiting the analysis to the two effects in the first column, it has to be determined (a) by how much LDC exports to other LDCs will increase as a consequence of a tariff cut for intra-LDC trade, and (b)
by how much LDC imports from DCs will decrease because part of the DC This procedure implies that the enlarged total imports (i.e. af ter preferential tariff cuts) of an LDC are scaled down, proportionally for all countries of origin, to the original (pre-tariff-cut) total import level. In other words, per importing LDC the value of a Q is reduced by the reciproke of post-tariff-cut imports over pre-tariff-cut imports according to the gravity equation. Thus, net trade creation is made to be zero, and the lowering of tariffs only results in a partial switch
Cross-section regressions for fairly long series of successive years have shown a great stability in the parameter estimates obtained; see e.g. Aitken (1973) , Sapir (1981) and Van Maanen (1988) .
from DC suppliers to LDC suppliers.
The implication of all this is that the present approach only yields an gives LDC exporters a larger share in the constant import total. In reality, the actual situation is likely to be an in-between case: some products supplied by LDCs wil.1 primarily compete with domestic products produced in the importing èountries, and other products will compete primarily with existing DC supplies.
In our comparative-staties exercise, we will first determine the Table 2 per importing country and in Table   3 per export ing country. Columns (1) and (3) show the effects on LDC trade if it is assumed that no trade diversion occures, and columns (2) and (4) report the simulated changes in case of maximum trade diversion. The last column of Table 2 lists the initial tariff levels of the individual countries.
The numerical findings given in Table 2 require little further comment.
The magnitude of the percentage-wise import increases can easily be understood, given the initial tariff level (column 5), the assumed tariff cut, and the 'elasticities' £ mentioned above. It is somewhat surprising that the differences between the columns (1) and (2) thus far, the analysis has focused on the consequences of a lowering of the import tariffs T m that constitutè a barrier for foreign supplies seeking to enter the LDC domestic markets. As discussed in section 2 already, this is but one role that is played by tariffs in an explanation of foreign trade levels. There is another effect that has to be taken into account as well: high tariffs not only curtail imports, but at the same time •redace"thë" export öfieritation of production. In the gravity equation this tendency was introduced in the form of the variable T e , i.e. the (import) tariff level as an explanatory variable at the export side. In due time, a lowering of the tariff level will lead to a stronger world-market orientation of the manufacturing sector and to a larger export share of manufacturing production. This medium-to long-term effect may be simulated by reducing, in the gravity equation as estimated before, the value of the variable T e .
Again the simulations concern two levels of tariff reduction, by 20 and by 50 percent, respectively. Obviously, in these cases the tariffs in their import-curtailing function (T m ) are lowered as well, and by the same percentage. As the latter are lowered for intra-South trade only, the export-expanding effect of a lower T e is also assumed to apply to export flows to Southern countries only. Thus, in their trade contacts with DCs the LDCs remain relatively 'closed' economies (i.e. with shows at once that the magnitudes of the changes are much greater: not only is the export-side effect added to the import-side effect, but the former is also stronger than the latter as the absolute value of 0:3 is larger than that of og.
Because all changes in the trade flows are computed according to the 'standard pattern' of the gravity equation, the largest increases in both imports and exports are predicted again for countries with the highest initial tariff levels. Thus, in case of LDC tariff preferences of 50 percent the imports of Bangladesh and of Pakistan would take twice their original level (Table 4 , column 3), and percentage-wise their exports would grow even stronger (Table 5, Table 6 .
As this and the preceding tables show, the issue of trade creation versus trade diversion cannot be settled in the approach foliowed in As neither the case of no trade diversion nor that of maximum diversion is likely to be a realistic one, an in-between result should actually be expected. The overall quantitative conclusion of the analysis might thus be formulated as follows. For the present sample of countries, and using the methodology of this paper, a GSTP tariff preference for manufactured products of 20 percent is expected to lead to a South- In assessing these consequences, two stages are Langhammer (1987) , in a study of the effects of preferential tariff reductions among LDCs for nine individual countries, also deals with all trade, rather than trade in manufactures.
distinguished: the short-term or demand-side effects resulting from lower import tariffs as such, and the long-term effects which comprise in addition the supply-side effects of a stronger export orientation of the manufacturing sector.
In the simulation exercise, a crucial assumption is that the estimated parameter values of the gravity equation remain unchanged. The assumption of unchanging structural coefficients also allows an assessment of the maximum of trade diversion that might occur as a consequence of a GSTP; however, whether or not -or rather to what extent -trade diversion will occur cannot be established in this approach.
The numerical results obtained are summarized in Table 6 above. For the present sample of countries it is found that For reasons discussed earlier at some length, the numerical findings should not be interpreted as highly accurate forecasts but rather as being indicative of the likely order of magnitude. This is necessarily so when the country coverage in the sample is taken into account: many developing countries and centrally-planned economies could not be included. Apart from this factor, however, it has to be recognized that also the statistical base on which the numerical outcomes rest is not such as to warrant very precise quantitative predictions.
In terms of GSTP policy making, two conclusions stand out. The first is that the cumbersome and time-consuming process of negotiating the details of a GSTP implementation will only pay off if the eventual lowering of tariffs and non-tariff TCMs will be substantial; a lowering of trade barriers by, say, 10 or 20 percent will have a very limited trade-expanding effect only.1 The second conclusion is that the longterm effects of lower TCMs (which encompass a re-orientation of the manufacturing sector towards exporting to GSTP member-countries) are much more important than the immediate effects of easier access to LDC import markets, even though they will obviously take longer to materialize.
The passible consequences of a more rapid expansion of LDC exports of manufactures for the rate of growth of GNP are not dealt with here, and the same is true for other implications for the national economies of the countries concerned. These 'dynamic' consequences are often stated to be the .most important-ones-r --ïo--the-extent that such 'dynamic' effects are part and parcel of a less inward-oriented industrialization policy in LDCs, the present analysis yields some support to this view.
For all trade, Langhammer (1987) reaches a similar conclusion.
